The in-core instrumentation measures core power distribution and coolant temperature in local regions of the core in pressurized water reactors. The installation types are distinguished by the designs of routing paths that exit either through reactor bottom mounted instrument nozzles or through reactor top mounted instrument nozzles. Although each type has unique advantages, it is generally known that top mounted design is more competitive with respect to emphasizing nuclear safety issues and ability to cope with severe accidents. The international nuclear vendors have provided various types of reactors with top mounted design. Nuclear power reactors in Korea, however, only have been designed to be applicable to the use of bottom mounted design, and it has been pointed out that the capabilities of Korean reactors against severe accidents should be further enhanced. The paper deals with technical issues on reactor internal and external design, in-core instrumentation, support assembly, sealing mechanism with nozzles, handling, and analytical issues in order to establish the ways of development.
Introduction
The In-Core Instrumentation (ICI) used for nuclear power reactors consists of neutron flux monitoring devices and core exit thermocouples. Neutron flux monitoring devices are used to measure power distribution in local regions of core that is representative of the entire volume of core. Similarly, core exit thermocouples measure the temperature of reactor coolant outlet exiting selected fuel assemblies in core that serve as a representative sample of all the fuel assemblies in core. Together, these instruments provide the assurance that the core power being generated throughout core is consistent with the local power predictions upon which the safe operation of core is based. ICI routing paths can be varied for different plant designs depending on decisions made by the designer. There are distinguishing differences between the two designs whose ICI cables exit via Bottom Mounted (BM) instrument nozzles and via Top Mounted (TM) instrument nozzles. Generally, major advantages of BM-ICI are that these BM nozzle penetrations do not have to compete for space with Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) for nozzle penetrations in Reactor Vessel Closure Head (RVCH); ICI remo-val/installing work is independent of refueling process, and RV transit from RV nozzle to the monitoring point is direct and a short distance.
Despite of several advantages of BM-ICI, the use of TM-ICI is encouraged by international utilities. The accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants have provided the nuclear industry with the opportunity to realize the importance of severe accident issues. One of these issues is that the weakness of BM nozzles had been pointed out continuously since the Three Mile Island accident in the U.S. It is said that nozzles below reactor core increase the possibility of corium leakage through nozzles when the reactor core melts. In order to decrease the possibility of leakage, it is needed to avoid reactor lower head penetration, so it is recommended to install ICIs on the top of RV. Additionally, TM-ICI can provide more space in the RV lower head area, which was used for ICI guide tube routing. Lowering the elevation of RV improves the seismic resistance, avoids the extension of the primary pressure boundary, and allows the passive cooing for reactor cavity by gravity without supplying power. Another benefit of applying TM-ICI is to reduce the workload of in-service inspection for the bottom nozzles which are affected by Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC).
The international nuclear vendors have been in possession of various types of nuclear reactors with TM-ICI, but nuclear power reactors in Korea are designed to be only applicable to the use of BM-ICI. Although nuclear reactors with BM-ICI have some advantages of simple design of nuclear reactors and easy refueling procedures, utilities prefer TM-ICI design emphasizing nuclear safety issues and ability to cope with severe accidents. The purpose of this paper is to establish the ways of TM-ICI development. Prior to discussing technical issues, the current technologies of TM-ICI as well as nuclear reactors supplied by several international nuclear vendors have been reviewed. The paper presents important technical issues regarding reactor internal and external designs, ICI design, ICI sealing units and nozzles, and ICI handling procedures during refueling outage, and relevant analytical issues. In addition, the paper presents new types of nuclear reactors that can adopt TM-ICI and ICI support assembly inside the reactor.
Current Status of TM-ICI
In order to develop TM-ICI technologies, it is needed to review the current status of systems that have been provided in various reactors. Different reactor types with TM-ICI or BM-ICI are given in Table 1 . It shows that recent reactors have adopted TM-ICI by utilities.
Comparing to APR1400 reactor, Pre-System 80 reactor containing TM-ICI design has the features of shorter RV with less volume of coolant above core, higher elevation of reactor coolant system hot and cold leg nozzles relative to the top of core. Also, it has an individual Control Element Assembly (CEA) shroud around each CEA assembly in upper internals. The . AP1000 reactor has similar components and features comparing to Pre-System 80 reactor. AP1000 reactor features eight nozzles for TM-ICI at the periphery of RVCH and penetrations which can pass up to six ICIs through each ICI nozzle. Below RVCH, upper and lower guide tubes provide the support and routing for TM-ICI, and the separation is formed at Instrumentation Grid Assembly (IGA) [3] . IGA rests upon the upper support plate that provides structural support for IGA plate. TM-ICI thimble tubes are mounted on and extend below IGA plate down into the fuel monitoring points through upper support columns. Above IGA, ICI guide tubes are collected into stalks, which are groupings of eight thimble tubes that lead to RVCH penetrations [7] .
U.S. EPR reactor also has similar features comparing to AP1000 reactor except several ICI technologies. Instrumentation lance is the basic mechanical unit of in-core neutron flux measuring system. U.S. EPR has two different systems for in-core neutron flux measurement. Guide tubes and protective tubes, containing either an Aeroball Measurement System (AMS) finger or a Self-Powered Neutron Detector (SPND) string, are suspended from a lance yoke resting on the top plate of upper core structure between control rod guide assemblies [4] . AMS is based on a pneumatic system that inserts steel balls containing vanadium into the forty detector locations in core. AMS probes are distributed over core by twelve ICI lances. Each in-core lance contains one SPND finger and either three or four Aeroball fingers, depending on instrumentation lance yoke type [5] .
U.S. APWR+ reactor uses TM-ICI and all ICIs from one Top-Mounted Instrumentation Assembly (TMIA) are assembled and penetrate RVCH through one penetration. TMIA is an ICI distribution component, which is different from CE and WEC tube support plates. There are a total of fifteen ICI system nozzle penetrations on RVCH. In-core monitoring consists of both neutron flux monitoring and core exit temperature monitoring devices. Flux mapping is accomplished using movable neutron detectors while core exit temperature is found using thirty-nine core exit thermocouples. Detectors are sheathed in ICI thimble assembly which penetrate RVCH, pass through upper core internals, and terminate at the bottom of fuel assemblies. Various core locations are chosen for flux mapping by locating movable neutron detectors in thimbles located in fuel assembly [6] .
Technical Issues of TM-ICI
Based on the review of current technologies of TM-ICI, technical issues are needed to be studied in order to develop TM-ICI. The study proceeds in the areas of reactor design, ICI detector, ICI nozzles, sealing mechanism, ICI routing inside and outside of RV, and maintenance.
Reactor Design
It is recognized that APR1400 reactor design should be modified to apply TM-ICI. The major reason for the modification is that there is no available space in UGS for TM-ICI guide tube bends because of the feature of CEA shrouds and Inner Barrel Assembly (IBA). The features of CEA shrouds and IBA are affected by fuel type and CEA types, whether it be four-finger CEAs or twelve-finger CEAs. CEA shrouds of APR1400 block each other due to upper plenum so that there is no room for passing through ICI guide tubes and their supports between CEA shrouds. Therefore, top hats do not allow the space for ICI guide tube routing, and it is needed to be removed from IBA. It is observed that reactor internals designed by international vendors have no barrier between CEA shrouds, which blocks ICI guide tube routing and space for ICI routing. Furthermore, these reactor internals were designed to have a deep barrel ensuring enough rooms. Based on these considera-157 tions, a new design of RV is applied for TM-ICI development shown in Figure 1 . The new type of upper internal design is modified to shorten the depth of UGS barrel with UGS plate for stiffening CEA shroud structures, and to consider the cross flow in upper plenum through flow holes at the bottom of UGS barrel. By stiffening CEA shrouds such that primary modes of vibration are dampened, TM-ICI blocking structures such as IBA can be removed to free up space in the upper internals.
The new reactor applies design parameters for TM-ICI development that are presented in Table 2 . Fifty ICIs and fifty seven CEAs are distributed in core. ICIs are arranged in fuel assemblies avoiding the locations of CEAs, as shown in Figure 2 . 
Detector Material Selection
The purpose of fixed in-core detector is to continuously monitor the behavior of core, to measure core power distribution, and to provide information to on-line surveillance and monitoring systems. SPNDs are well suited for this function and becoming increasingly popular for deployment in Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) cores to calibrate ex-core monitoring systems and for primary core monitoring. SPNDs have the advantages of not requiring external power source, having comparatively simple designs, robust structure, small mechanical size, good stability under high temperature and pressure, generating reproducible linear signals, and low depletion rate. However, the disadvantages of SPNDs are considered to have the limited operating range due to relatively low neutron sensibility, compensation for background noise, and delayed signal response depending on emitter material. The characteristics of common emitters in SPNDs are compared in Table 3 depending on material used for the emitter.
Rhodium detectors are commonly used for nuclear power plants in Korea and are well suited for core monitoring and surveillance due to relatively high neutron sensitivity. However, the major disadvantage of Rhodium detectors is the change in sensitivity due to depletion of emitter caused by high burn up rate so that it requires more frequent replacement of the ICI assemblies. Although Vanadium detectors have many of the same advantages as do Rhodium detectors, they produce weak signals resulting from lower burn-up rate comparing to Rhodium detectors [9] . However, as the capability of the plant data acquisition system improved, the weak signals from these detectors may no longer pose difficulty. Other detector materials including Platinum and Cobalt are not as well suited for use in PWR to provide flux-mapping and surveillance information, because they produce neutron-gamma reactions that are more difficult to translate into local power distribution information, and require more compensation, signal processing, and calibration compared to Rhodium or Vanadium detectors. Additionally, these detectors have not provided reliable experience for the intended functions. Consequently, it is judged that Rhodium and Vanadium detectors are the best for PWR power measurement applications due to the reaction with neutron emits an electron directly making easier direct measurement of flux or power, sufficient signal strength to facilitate data processing, reasonable life time to achieve economic plant operations, and sufficient experience to support reliable operations and licensing. 159 by a J-groove attachment weld on the interior, cladded RVCH wall. This method is to use a pipe which is forcibly inserted into penetration hole of RVCH. Partial penetration "J" groove welds are provided to connect RVCH with nozzle via Inconel buttering and Inconel weld metal, which are shown in Figure 3 (a) . It is generally known that J-groove weld may result in PWSCC due to high residual tensile stresses on the weld surface. This method is utilized for CEDM nozzles in CE type reactors as well as OPR1000 and APR1400 reactors. Other method for AP1000 TM-ICI uses an external weld buildup around the penetration hole on RVCH in Figure 3 (b) [12&13] . To address this technical issue, ICI nozzles which are integral with RVCH are currently considering for TM-ICI development. This approach of using full penetration butt welds eliminates the risks associated with PWSCC, and removes the highly stressed inner corner radius regions of typical J-groove welds. There is a comparison of nozzle types in Table 4 . This would increase plant capital cost somehow but decrease in-service inspection requirements. Therefore, it will decrease possibility of future need for repair of partial penetration weld. Also, it is surveyed that ICI nozzles for TM-ICI in various reactors were located at the periphery of RVCH to allow access for assembly/disassembly, and to reduce the required length of ICI nozzles. Therefore, fifty seven CEDM penetrations encompass the majority of the center of RVCH, and eight TM-ICI penetrations are symmetrically located along the periphery of RVCH for efficient TM-ICI cable routing inside Integrated Head Assembly (IHA) as shown in Figure 4 . To date, the experience with TM-ICI multi-cable RVCH seals in the U.S. has been with two seal designs -a "Grayloc" by CE and a "QuickLoc" by WEC. The only operating experience of commercial U.S. reactors with TM-ICI is the early CE reactors with "Grayloc". "QuickLoc" design will be used in the future AP1000 reactor and was applied to CE reactors replacing "Grayloc".
ICI
The Grayloc seal mechanisms consist of nozzles welded to RVCH that contain hermetic radiation-proof seals that are maintained between interior and exterior of RV. Seal mechanisms are designed to allow connection and disconnection in cramped and hazardous environments such as the area above RVCH. The designs shown above in Figure 5 (a) use a Grayloc hub which is clamped to a Grayloc flange, protruding radially around the upper end of nozzle. This secure clamp maintains the fluid-tight radioactive-proof seal for the plurality of ICIs passing through nozzle. During refueling outage, Grayloc clamp is required to be unbolted, and then each individual ICI nut is removed, so instrumentation is disconnected and head can be removed. Preceding head removal, a bullet nose is applied to a cluster of ICIs such that its integrity can be maintained during head removal and re-installation [14&15].
The QuickLoc seal mechanism allows for disconnection of instrumentation during a refueling outage, and decoupling of instrumentation when replacements are needed, and serves as a primary pressure boundary for reactor coolant system. As depicted in Figure  5 (b), QuickLoc instrument nozzles and sealing assembly is a standalone piece that is welded to RVCH. There are two distinct pressure boundaries seals inherent in QuickLoc design. The first pressure boundary exists between plug and in-vessel instrument thimble assembly. This boundary is maintained by compression seals inherent in Swagelok body fitting designs. This boundary seal does not need to be broken when RVCH is removed for refueling, unless instru- 161 ment cable or in-core instrumentation thimble assembly itself requires replacement. The secondary boundary is between the plug and QuickLoc instrument nozzle, and this is disassembled for refueling after RV is depressurized, prior to RVCH removal [12] . Referred to these two designs, sealing mechanism of RV head penetration for TM-ICI is preliminarily designed to allow connection and disconnection of ICIs, and to maintain the pressure boundary of reactor coolant. Sealing mechanism for TM-ICI in Figure 6 consists of sealing plug ring, O-ring, clamping nut, retainer bolt, Swagelok, and ICI guide tube cluster. Sealing plug ring is a main component to maintain the pressure boundary, which is designed to be inserted between ICI penetration tube and ICI guide tube cluster, and is supported by the top of ICI guide tube cluster through retainer bolts. There are three O-rings to secure the primary sealing in the inner and outer side of sealing plug ring. Clamping nut is a double seal device to maintain the pressure boundary against reactor coolant leakage. It is expected that the greatest advantage of this sealing mechanism is to simplify sealing components for reducing radiation exposure, and prompt connection and disconnection of ICIs.
When ICI cables penetrate seal plug, it is expected that there are up to eight ICI cables. The ICI cable is in the form of an oversheath containing six instruments for monitoring the power distribution and core exit temperature of fuel assembly [17] . The ICI oversheath is directed immediately into a guide tube as it exits seal plug into reactor coolant. Each ICI cable has its own guide tube which will lead cable from seal plug to the top of Instrumentation Tube Support Assembly (ITSA) plate. As shown in Figure 7 (a) , the main advantage of ITSA is that it uses sealing assemblies to bundle fifty-seven TM-ICI guide tubes into eight bundles. This design reduces the time needed to disconnect TM-ICI guide tubes from RVCH during refueling outages. It also potentially improves the safety of reactor due to a lower number of penetrations in RVCH. At the seal end of nozzle, ICI cables enter into a guide tube exiting below seal plug. The groups of these guide tubes form stalks that exit the bottom of RV nozzle into RV upper plenum. Inside RV, each ICI cable is direc- ted to fuel assembly through a series of guide tubes that protect the wires from corrosion, vibrations, and damage from the loose parts. The prototypic design feature for TM-ICI distribution in upper internals is shown in Figure 7 (b) . The stalks of 6 ~ 8 ICI guide tubes begin diverging in upper internals in order to reach the radial location of monitoring vertically below UGS plate. ICI guide tubes are further supported with a bolt or screw-type connection to ITSA plate. This ensures upper internals guide tubes remain fixed in place relative to upper internals at all times. The UGS serves to support and align the upper ends of fuel assemblies, prevents the lifting of fuel assemblies in the event of a loss of coolant accident, and maintains the spacing of CEAs. As shown in Figure 7 (b), support columns are also used as ICI thimble tubes which serve to guide and protect ICIs between ITSA plate and core. The entrances and exits of ICI thimble tube are beveled to reduce any friction imposed on ICI during removal and insertion, and mitigate ICI misalignment. The head area of RV has a great number of cables just from the large number of CEDMs, each of which has a power cable and multiple signal and control cables. This is made more difficult for those cables that are safety related since this requires a degree of separation and isolation to avoid common cause failure, and this usually leads to the need for multiple separate pathways through IHA as depicted in Figure 8 (a) [16] . Above seal assembly, TM-ICI is bundled and routed up through the inside of IHA shown in Figure 8 (b) . No instrumentation guide tubes are required in IHA since the primary pressure is sealed at RVCH, saving a large amount of space.
ICI Handling During Refueling Outage
The key changes when going from BM-ICIs to TM-ICIs are the need to pull ICI seal plugs through RVCH as it is lifted, and the need to lift ICIs out of core together with the removal of upper internals, prior to being able to remove fuel assemblies. For BM-ICI reactors, there are no competing movements above core that would prevent the strategy of lifting all CEAs out of core at the start of refueling process, since ICIs are removed from the bottom of RV head. The process of lifting CEAs out of core by the same lift rig used for the UGS lift involves lowering the lift rig so that a stationary extension shaft guide plate provides for the initial alignment of the ends of CEA extension shafts and then a lowered CEA support plate is attached to the ends of all extension shafts in order to lift CEAs from core as shown in Figure 9 . Polar crane that lifts CEA support plate pauses in its lift of UGS structure after CEA support plate is locked in the raised position, before continuing the lift of overall upper internals. This UGS lift rig design presents some difficulties. Since stationary extension shaft guide plate would prevent lifting ITSA plate below CEA support plate assembly, if stationary extension shaft plate is removed, any lost benefit of the stiffness of plate on the overall qualification of lift rig would have to be assessed, and the loss of the alignment benefits of stationary extension shaft plate would have to be compensated by a modification of movable CEA support plate assembly. Assuming that both CEA removal procedure and the use of TM-ICIs are to be joined for new design, some modifications are needed for UGS lift rig. The stationary extension shaft guide plate seen in Figure  9 must be removed before lift rig will be able to be connected to UGS lift rig. In order to achieve the modification, UGS lift rig needs to add additional support bars to attach lift rig used to raise CEA ESA support plate to ITSA plate. The conceptual idea for this is shown in Figure 10 (a) , for which the bars to be attached to ITSA plate are shown as extending from CEA ESA support plate. This added rigging feature must be able to be attached to ITSA plate when CEA ESA support plate is lowered to latch the tops of extended shaft assemblies. In this fully withdrawn position, UGS assembly will be fully removed from RV and transported to the top of UGS stand where it will be placed during refueling outage.
In order for CEAs to be removed and replaced while UGS structure is on UGS stand, UGS lift rig must be removed. The practice is to disconnect all ESAs from CEAs, permitting them to rest at the bottom of CEA guide tubes, on the floor beneath UGS stand. If ITSA plate was removed with UGS lift rig, ICIs would be extracted fully from UGS-mounted thimble tubes, and reassembly later would not be practicable with loose ICIs dangling below ITSA plate. Therefore, ITSA plate needs to be support separately by UGS structure before it is detached from lift rig. In order for this to occur, ICIs must be supported by "jack stands" while upper internals are supported by UGS stand. By adding this ancillary support feature, ITSA plate will not be forced to be totally removed from UGS structure when lift rig is removed. The concept for installing jack stands is shown in Figure 10 (b).
Analysis and Test
One of analytical issues for developing TM-ICI is the evaluation of structural integrity for ITSA that supports various in-core instruments routing from RVCH penetration to reactor core [10] . As shown in Figure 7 (a), ITSA is expected to be supported by UGS support plate through several support pins bolted on ITSA plate at its lower side and by RVCH through eight nozzles at its upper side. Therefore, various loads on ITSA are expected to move through these support points during normal operation and accidental conditions. Static loads on ITSA include deadweight, spring preload, and steady state hydraulic pressure. Dynamic loads on ITSA include pump pulsation load (including vessel motion & hydraulic pressure), random turbulence load (including vessel motion & hydraulic pressure), vortex shedding load, seismic load and loss of coolant accident load. In order to minimize the effect of flow induced vibration, ITSA design shall try to avoid the reactor coolant pump passing frequencies. Structural analyses using finite element analysis model should be performed to calculate structural response due to each type of load. Results should be then combined using the appropriate combination method specified on the design specification. Finally, the combined stresses should be compared to the ASME Code stress limits and fatigue limits for the qualification of the ITSA.
Another analytical issue for developing TM-ICI is insertion test using the full scale mock-up to measure the forces exerted on ITSA upon insertion into and withdrawal from the limiting guiding path [11] . The purpose of this test is to determine if ITSA can be manually inserted into the guide path over its design life time, and to provide experimental demonstration that ITSA will be easily inserted. Test will be planned to simulate wear and possible strain-hardening over the design life of ITSA because strainhardening can cause the insertion and withdrawal forces to gradually increase with each insertion/withdrawal evolution. Test results gained from the insertion test will be used to benchmark a finite element analysis model of the insertion test for use in evaluating design changes. Primary contributors to this guide path should be included the contact friction due to necessary non-vertical guide path features, contact friction due to stress-induced curvature of detector assembly, and buoyancy and any pressure differential forces that exist between the top and bottom of guide conduit.
Conclusions
TM-ICI is a viable strategy for decreasing the possibilities of leakage under severe accidents, improving the seismic resistance, avoiding the extension of primary pressure boundary typically performed in BM-ICI designs, and providing more space in RV lower head area. However, it has never been adopted in Korean nuclear power plants because of the repetitive application of BM-ICI to nuclear construction in the past thirty years and a lack of knowledge, guidelines and experience of TM-ICI. In order to establish TM-ICI development strategy for Korean nuclear power plants, current TM-ICI technologies have been surveyed. The recent trend shows that international nuclear suppliers have various reactor designs adopting many types of TM-ICI. It seems that they have been aware of the importance and a benefit of TM-ICI in consideration of safety issues on the bottom of RV. The paper involves the reactor designs, reactor internals, ICI arrangement and support mechanism inside and outside RV designed by international vendors. Through the survey, features of TM-ICI as well as reactors for developing TM-ICI have been understood. Most of all, it is recognized that reactor internals should be modified in the manners that deepen upper plenum and permit no blockage between CEA shrouds allowing 165 ICI guide tube routing. It applies a new type of reactor for TM-ICI application, which is introduced in this paper. AP1000 and Pre-System 80 reactors commonly used a circular plate fitting into reactor internals, and such plate had a role to support ICI guide tubes and thimbles. The concepts lead to the conceptual design of ITSA for this project. The sealing mechanism used for CE and WEC reactors was reviewed and the design concepts for TM-ICI sealing unit are addressed in this paper. Appropriate materials of ICI detector are also surveyed to extend the life of ICI use. Prior to application of TM-ICI in the plants, analysis and test should be done to prove and verify its performance. Based on the current TM-ICI technologies, reactor design, reactor internals, RV head penetration nozzles, detector materials, ITSA, ICI routing, ICI operation and handling as well as analysis and test regarding TM-ICI are discussed as main topics of technical issue. It is expected that each of them requires many efforts to develop and complete TM-ICI design. The design of TM-ICI is still in its infant stage in Korea, so more efforts are to be made for the establishment of the conceptual design for TM-ICI.
